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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELWOOD K. McFARLAND, 
) 
) 
vs. 
Plaintiff/Respondent.) 
) Case No. 18352 
SKAGGS , INC . , 
) 
) 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 
) 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves an action for false arrest where the 
Plaintiff, Elwood K. McFarland, was initially approached by a Skaggs 
employee in connection with an investigation of alleged shoplifting 
but based upon an alleged altercation between Plaintiff and the 
Skaggs employee, Plaintiff was subsequently arrested for an assault. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial was heard on January 11 and 12, 1982, in the District 
Court of the Second Judicial District in and for Weber County, State 
of Utah before a jury with the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, Judge presi-
ding. Based on the Court's instructions, the jury determined that 
the arrest by the Skaggs employee was not lawful and awarded the 
Plaintiff $10,000.00 in general damages and $25,000.00 in punitive 
damages. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant/Appellant Skaggs contends that the Court's instruc-
tions (1) requiring that in order for Skaggs to satisfy its burden 
of proof on its affirmative defense of justification for detention 
by reason of an arrest for assault it had to prove beyond a reason-
able doubt (a criminal standard in a civil trial) that McFarland 
would be found guilty of the crime of assault in a criminal court, 
and (2) advising the jury that in Utah there is no statutory privi-
lege protecting against an unlawful arrest for assault based on 
one having probable cause to believe that an assault had been 
committed, were improper and constituted reversable, prejudicial 
error making it impossible for Skaggs to get a fair trial and based 
thereon, Skaggs seeks to have the lower Court's judgment reversed 
and the cause remanded back to the lower Court for a new trial 
with proper instructions. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 9th day of January, 1980, Elwood McFarland, a dentist 
and a resident of Ogden, Utah, entered the Ogden Skaggs Drug Center 
located at 24th Street and Monroe Blvd. to purchase a t.v. antenna 
plug. (Record pg. 6) The Plaintiff, after entering the store, pro· 
ceeded to the display stand where the desired electrical antenna 
plugs were located. McFarland fingered through the display of the 
electrical plugs. Apparently being unable to find the particular 
plug, be began to search in nearby areas in which an electrical plug 
might have been misplaced under an affiliated heading. (Record pg. 
11) After finishing a check of possible locations of the wanted 
article, Plaintiff became satisfied that the particular antenna 
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plug he wanted was not in stock. Plaintiff then proceeded to leave 
the store. 
What the Plaintiff did not know was that during the time he 
had been perusing through the merchandise at the display stands, 
he had been watched by Anita Avondet, a Skaggs Security Officer. 
(Record p. 93) Avondet testified that she saw the Plaintiff take 
an electrical part off the shelf, and put it in his right hand 
trenchcoat pocket. (Record p. 93) Avondet had been standing on a 
catwalk, behind a one way mirror observing the customer traffic 
on the electrical aisle. (Record p. 110) 
Immediately after passing through the door leaving Skaggs, 
the Plaintiff was approached by Anita Avondet. According to 
McFarland, Avondet stopped McFarland with the words: "Sir I'd , 
like to talk to you". (Record p. 14, 42) or "Sir, I want to talk 
to you." (Record p. 16) According to Avondet, she stopped McFarland 
with the words: "Sir, I'm with Skaggs Security. I need to have 
you come back into the store with me." (Record pg. 95, 98) Accord-
ing to McFarland, he thought she was selling something (Record 
p .. 14, 42) and so.· he said "I'm not interested" (Record p. 14) or 
"I don't want to" (Record p. 16) and "I was moving her away so I 
could go to my car." (Record p. 14) or "I moved her away in an 
attempt to walk around her to my automobile." (Record p. 16) On 
cross examination, McFarland was asked: "Your reaction then to her 
statement "Sir, I'd like to talk to you" was simply to take your 
left arm and push her out of the way as you proceeded past her." 
McFarland responded: "Yes, I extended my arm and was trying to 
walk around her .. ~ . Q. Was that in the area of the chest? 
-3-
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A. Yes." (Record p. 43) According to Avondet, McFarland struck 
her across the chest, pushing her, causing her to lose her 
balance, and she fell down against a rail. Avondet promptly 
got back up on her feet only to be struck again by McFarland. At 
this point, Avondet reached for her handcuffs and McFarland re-
portedly declared "O. K. , 0. K. , I' 11 go back in." (Record p. 95) 
Avondet testified that during this experience she was always in 
fear of immediate bodily harm and that she had been struck by 
McFarland once by his left hand and once by his right hand. (Record 
p. 96) 
In light of the altercation, Avondet escorted McFarland into 
the managers office for further questioning. (Record p. 96) When 
they reached the manager's office she requested that McFarland 
hand over his trenchcoat so that it could be examined so as to 
ascertain whether it contained the electrical part she had ob-
served him put in his right hand trenchcoat pocket. McFarland 
repled to Avondet that he was not about to hand over anything un-
til he was placed under arrest. At this point Avondet said "O.K., 
I'm placing you under citizen's arrest for assault". (Record p. 98) 
Avondet testified that at that time McFarland removed his trench-
coat and handed it to her. She examined this right hand pocket, 
the pocket into which she had seen McFarland place the part. Exam-
ination revealed the electrical part was not to be found in that 
pocket. She did not examine the left pocket because her observa-
tion was that he put in in the right pocket. (Record p. 98) At 
this juncture, Avondet called the police. 
-4-
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When the police arrived, McFarland was questioned about the 
alleged assualt on Avondet, and according to officer Lucas of the 
Ogden City Police Department, McFarland told him that "he had pushed 
her". (Record p. 70) Officer Lucas stated that Avondet told him 
that "she saw him pick up the t.v. plug and put in in his right 
coat pocket. He then walked past the check out stand and out the 
store without paying for it .... She left the catwalk and went 
·out side the store and approached Mr. McFarland and asked to talk 
to him, at which time he turned around and hit her. He took his 
right arm and struck her just below the neck, pushing her away." 
(Record p. 57) Officer Lucas testified Avondet told him "she 
feared for her safety" ... "like anybody that gets hit, she was 
scared, she got hit." (Record p. 83) Avondet also testified she 
was "in fear of bodily harm." (Record p. 97) Officer Lucas also 
testified that "from my investigation, myself personally, I felt 
an assault had been committed." (Record p. 69) McFarland told 
Officer Lucas that he thought Avondet was "a prostitute". (Record 
p. 50) According to Avondet, McFarland also told Lucas that 
"The only reason I struck her was because I thought she was a 
'hooker'." and "If I'd really wanted the merchandise there would 
have been nothing she could have done to have stopped me." (Record 
(Record p. 100) 
After discussing the matter with both McFarland and Avondet, 
Officer Lucas asked Avondet to accompany him outside the manager's 
office to the hall. There, Officer Lucas and Avondet had the 
following conversation: 
-5-
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Lucas: 
Avondet: 
Lucas: 
"Are you really hurt?" 
"Oh not that bad. Just you know 
I've been hit and I'm not bleed-
ing or cut or anything." 
"Well its up to you. We have a 
good assault case. It's up to 
you .. " 
(Record p. 59, 100) 
Because she wasn't hurt, Avondet decided not to have McFarland 
formally arrested for assault and because the merchandise Avondet 
had been McFarland place in his pocket was missing, it was decided 
that McFarland should simply be released. McFarland was informed 
promptly of his decision and he was told he was free to go. (Record 
p. 100) McFarland advised his wife of the incident and no other 
persons were aware of said incident until such time as McFarland 
filed his Complaint against Skaggs in late November, 1980, allegin~ 
false arrest and slander on the part of Skaggs and suing for $5, 000.~~ 
in general damages and $50,000.00 in punitive damages, after which 
an article appeared in the OGDEN STANDARD EXAMINER reporting that 
McFarland had filed his civil suit and gave a brief description of 
the substance of the law suit. 
THE COURTS INSTRUCTIONS 
At trial, Skaggs argued that Avondet was justified in detain· 
ing and s,earching McFarland for two reasons; to-wit, (1) the privile~t 
granted storeowners to detain and search suspected shoplifters and 
(2) the privilege granted to private persons to arrest and detain 
persons who have committed an assault of their person. The period 
of detention for each of the foregoing two reasons overlapped each 
-6-
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other and thus if Skaggs lawfully detained McFarland for either of 
the two reasons, the detention was justified and Skaggs is not liable 
to McFarland for false arrest. 
With regard to the first reason, (the merchant privilege 
arrest), Utah law provides as follows: 
"78-17-7 Shoplifting - Authority to Search. 
Any merchant may request an individual on his 
premises to place or keep in full view any 
merchandise such individual may have removed, 
or which the merchant has reason to believe 
he may have removed, from its place of display 
or elsewhere, whether for examination, pur-
chase, or for any othe~· reasonable purpose. 
No merchant shall be criminally or civilly 
liable on account of having make such a re-
quest." 
"78-11-18 Shoplifting - Authority to Detain. 
Any merchant who has reason to believe that 
merchandise has been wrongfully taken by an 
individual and that he can recover such 
merchandise by taking such individual into 
custody and detaining him may, for the purpose 
of attempting to effect such recovery or for 
the purpose of informing a peace officer of 
the circumstances of such detention, take the 
individual into custody and detain him, on the 
premises, in a reasonable manner and for a 
reasonable length of time. Such taking into 
custody and detention by a merchant or his 
employee shall not render such merchant or his 
employee criminally or civilly liable for false 
arrest, false imprisonment, slander or unlawful 
detention or for any other type of claim of action 
.unless such taking into custody and detention are 
unreasonable under all the circumstances." 
Skaggs requested that the Court instruct the jury on the above 
law in its Requested Instructions No. 5 and No. 6, but the Court re-
fused to do so. Instead the Court only gave Skaggs Requested Instruc-
tion No. 11 (the Court's Instruction No. 7) which was a summary 
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of Utah law as set forth in 76-6-603 and 604, which the Court felt 
also covered the law as set forth in 78-11-17 and 18. However, a 
reading of these statutes clearly show that the requirements are 
different. For example 78-11-17 does not require a reasonable 
belief of the merchant to search a suspected shoplifter whereas 
78-11-18 and 76-6-603 and 604 all require that the merchant have 
probable cause to detain a suspected shoplifter. 
With regard to the second reason (private citizen's privi-
lege to arrest), Utah law provides as follows: 
"77-13-4. By private persons - A private 
person may arrest another 
(1) For a public offense committed or 
attempted in his presence." 
Since an assault constitutes a "public offense" a private 
person has a privilege to arrest another person based on probable 
cause when said other person has committed an assault on the private 
person. Nevertheless, the Court in its Instruction No. 11 instructed 
the jury as follows: 
"There is no statutory privilege protecting 
against an unlawful arrest for assault based 
on one having probable cause to believe an 
assault had been committed." 
In addition to the above, the Court in its Instruction No. 
12 instructed the jury as follows: 
"A charge that Plaintiff Elwood Mc-
Farland, M.D. connnitted the crime of assault 
requires you to consider this issue under 
the rules applicable to the criminal action. 
A Defendant in a criminal action is presumed 
to be innocent until the contrary is proved, 
and in the case of reasonable doubt whether 
his guilt is satisfactorily shown he is 
-8-
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entitled to a verdict of 'not guilty'. 
This presumption places upon the person 
alleging the commission of a crime the 
burden of proving the Defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt." (This is the 
first paragraph. The second paragraph de-
fines reasonable doubt). 
LAW AND ANALYSIS 
POINT I 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 12 CONSTITUTED REVERSABLE 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN THAT IT INSTRUCTED AVONDET (SKAGGS) 
ARREST OF McFARLAND FOR AN ASSAULT WAS UNLAWFUL. SKAGGS 
HAD TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT (A CRIMINAL 
STANDARD IN A CIVIL TRIAL) THAT McFARLAND WOULD BE 
FOUND GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF ASSAULT IN A CRIMINAL COURT. 
The Court's Instruction No. 12 requiring the jury to "consider 
this issue under the rules applicable to a criminal action" would 
undeniably give any reasonable person acting as a juror a sense 
that he or she were passing judgment upon the Plaintiff for the crime 
of assault - guilty or not guilty. The logical outgrowth of this 
instruction in the trial was that if the Defendant, Skaggs, did 
not carry its burden of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" of the 
Plaintiff 1 s criminal guilt, then the Defendant was liable for false 
arrest. 
The Court~s Instruction No. 11 clearly outlined the con-
sequences to Skaggs if it failed to carry this misapplied burden. 
"You are instructed that if the Plaintiff 
committed an assault on Anita Avondet and she 
had the right to arrest the Plaintiff and to 
detain him for the purposes of surrendering 
him to the custody of a peace officer. 
However, if an assault had not been 
committed, then she had no right to arrest 
Plaintiff. There is no statutory privilege 
protecting against an unlawful arrest for 
assault based on one having probable cause 
to believe an assault had been committed." 
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The Court's Instruction Nos. 11 and 12 gave Plaintiff's 
counsel the green light to argue to the jury as follows: 
"Now just two things to make sure we really 
understand what we're doing, and as far as bur-
den of proof is concerned, again going back to 
these instructions. It's the burden, the 
absolute and total and compie~e burden of the 
Defendant, that is Skaggs, to prove to you people 
beyond a reasonable doubt, a criminal standard, 
that an assault as defined in the Utah State 
Statute, was committed ... It is the burden 
of Skaggs to prove criminally that Dr. McFarland 
assaulted Ms. Avondet. I would suggest to you 
that they have not carried that burden. Failing 
to do it, the jury would have to conclude that 
you have a false arrest for assault. It's as 
simple as that. They, failing their burden, 
they lose. Damages must be assessed." (Record 
p. 258, 259) 
The Court allowed the Plaintiff to prove his case by a preponderance 
whereas the Court required the Defendant Skaggs to prove its case 
"beyond a reasonable doubt''. The Court was clearly in error and 
prevented Skaggs from having a fair trial. 
In 30 Am Jur 2d on Evidence, Section 1169, it states in 
pertinent part as follows: 
"It is well settled in substantially all the 
jurisdictions in the United States, or at least 
in all those in which the question has been 
directly raised, that facts constituting a crime 
need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt if 
they are at issue in a civil action, but that 
it is sufficient to prove the existence of the 
criminal act by preponderance of the evidence. 
Thus, altho~gh fact~ may be alleged that, if 
true, constitute guilt in the party charged, 
~or which he might be indicted and punished, 
it does not follow that the proof, in order to 
maintain the cause of action or defense, must 
be sue~ as ~ould conv~ct the party charged of 
the crime, if upon trial under an indictment. 
TJ;us, in a civil action where there is an allega-
tion of fraud or forgery, or a criminal mis-
appropriation of property, or false representa-
tions, or a trespass which might subject the 
trespassers to criminal prosecution._ p~oof be-
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yond a reasonable doubt is not required, 
and it is generally held that a preponder-
ance of the evidence is sufficient. In a civil 
action for assault and battery, the fact that 
the act forming the basis of the action is also 
a crime does not require the Plaintiff to sus-
tain the allegations of his Complaint by 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (the same 
would apply to an affirmative defense) Al-
though some cases, in defining the degree of 
proof essential to establish in a civil 
action facts which constitute a crime, have 
used expressions which seem to require more 
than a mere preponderance of the evidence, they 
are apparently not intended to require proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt. 
While, in a civil case, a presumption exists 
that the party to whom a criminal act is imputed 
is innocent, such presumption may be overcome 
by a preponderance of the evidence. However, it 
has been said that this presumption should 
yield only to satisfactory evidence, which would 
unavoidably require clearer proof than would be 
necessary in a case involving no criminality. 
For example, according to some authorities, to 
create a preponderance of evidence in favor of 
a defense of alteration of an instrument, the 
presumption of innocence must be overcome, and 
therefore, the proof should be clear and con-
vincing. 
In some of the earlier cases it was held that 
a criminal act which is directl in issue in a 
civi case must e esta is e eton a reason-
able doubt. But these cases areor the most 
part no longer authoritative, and in some in-
stances have been ex ressl overruled." 30 Am. Jr. 
Evi ence Section 1 9. (Emp asis added and 
language in brackets added) 
In light of the lack of legal basis for using a criminal burden in 
a civil trial, one might point out that it would obviously be rever-
sable, prejudicial error if in a criminal case the prosecution were 
allowed to prove the guilt of the accused by a preponderance of the 
evidence. The law is consistent in its burden in criminal actions; 
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that consistency is not less important in civil actions. In 
particular, when the case involves a question of assault, as in 
the case at bar, the degree of proof required in 6 Am. Jr. 2d 
Assault and Battery Section 207, is as follows: 
"The basic doctrine which authorizes issues 
of fact to be determined in accordance with the 
preponderance or weight of the evidence applies 
to civil actions to recover damages for assault 
and battery and to affirmative defenses therein. 
The fact that the act formin the basis of the 
so a crimina act oes not re uire 
Prejudicial error was made when the Court imposed upon the 
Defendant the burden of criminal proof for the elements of the 
crime of assault in this case. The elements of the crime of assault 
were only tangentially at issue. If it had been a case where Anita 
Avondet was trying to recover money damages from McFarland for 
assault, then the elements of the crime of assault would have been 
directly in issue, but as we have seen, even then Avondet would not 
have had to prove them "beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Proof "beyond a reasonable doubt•' as a standard in civil 
cases is not one which appears to have any foundation in modern 
jurisprudence. The history of criminal standards in civil trials 
is well laid out in 124 ALR 1378 in an annotation entitled "Reason-
able Doubt Rule As Applicable To Evidence In Civil Cases Of Facts 
Amounting To A Felony Or Misdemeanor.", where the annotator summar-
izes the rule in the United States by stating: 
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"It seems to be well settled in substantially 
all the jurisdictions in this country or at 
least in all those in which the question has 
been directly raised, that facts constitutin~ 
a crime need not be raven be and a reasonab e 
ou t i t ey action. 
124 ALR 1380. 
In support of the above proposition, the annotator cites court 
authority in 34 different states, as well as the Federal Courts, 
for this wide and well founded law. The article also cites case 
law which provides an interesting analogy to the instant case. 
for instance a case around the turn of the century stated that in 
order to make 
"Good a defense of justification on the 
ground of truth in an action for slander 
in charging a crime, the Defendant [was] 
required to prove the Plaintiff guilty of 
the crime imported to him [by the Defendant] 
by testimony sufficient to convict the 
Plaintiff of those charges on a criminal trial." 
However, regarding this proposition the annotation states the 
general rule as follows: 
"But this view, so far as it was adopted, 
has since been overruled expressly or by 
implication. (cites omitted) An instruction 
in an action for libel that if a crime is 
charged against the Plaintiff by the publica-
tion in question, then the Defendant, in order 
to show the truth of the charge, must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the Plaintiff 
committed the crime, was declared to be unsound, 
as a preponderance of evidence is sufficient." 
124 ALR 1385. 
These vintage cases, declaring the burden to be only a 
preponderance of the evidence even though the elements of a crime 
are at issue in a civil case, are still good law across the United 
States~ In Lazarus vs. Pascuzzi, 333 N.E. 2d 1079 (Ill. 1979), 
which involved the sale of a boat without the consent of the owner, 
_,~-
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the trial court applied a reasonable doubt standard of proof for 
a criminal act in a civil action. The reviewing court granted 
a new trial stating as follows: 
"The Court clearly s~ated that proof of 
criminal activity requires proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. This is not true in a civil 
case when a violation of law is relied on. In 
a civil action, the violation like ever oth& 
act at issue need on be rove a re-
'-pon erance o the evidence. cites omitted 
Because it affirmatively appears on the record 
that the trial court may have applied the wrong 
standard of proof to the agents at issue and did 
in fact apply the incorrect standard to the 
proof of the criminal act, we must reverse and 
remand for a new trial. Since the existence of 
agency in the possible criminal acts are issues 
of fact, the resolution of which depends largely 
upon the weight of the evidence and the cred-
ibility of the witnesses, only a new trial applying 
the correct preponderance of the evidence standard 
to the evidence can correct the possible error at 
trial. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial 
court ... is reversed and the cause is remanded 
for a new trial." 333 N.E. 2d 1080 
Sively vs. American National Insurance, 454 S.W. 2d 799, 
454 S.W. 2d at 802 (Tex. 1970), the court held as follows: 
"Plaintiff further urges that the Defendant 
must prove the decreased was intoxicated beyond 
a reasonable doubt as in any criminal case. We 
find no Texas case directly in point, but in 
124 ALR 1380, we f~nd this snatement: 'It seems 
to be well settled in substantially all the 
jurisdictions in this country, or at least in 
all those in which the question has been directly 
raised, that facts constituting a crime need not 
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt if they are 
at issue in a civil case.' Therefore, we will 
follow the majority and hold that the facts con-
stituting intoxication need be proven by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence as in all civil suits." 
454 S.W. 2d at 802. 
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Furthermore, in Orient_ Insurance Company vs. Cox, 238 
S~W.2d 757 (Ark, 1951), an insurance case concerning a fire in which 
the crime of arson was at issue, the court stated as follows: 
"Appellants made numerous specific objections 
to the giving of Instruction No. 7. It is argued 
that the instruction is abstract, misleading and 
prejudicial in that it employed language which is 
only applicable in criminal cases and invaded the 
province of the jury by cormnenting on the weight 
of the evidence. The well settled rule in this 
in civil cases is that facts constitutin 
_ i e nstruction No. ec are t at on y a 
preponderance of the evidence was required, 
there are other cases where circumstantial 
evidence and the presumption of innocence are 
involved and proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
is required. This language was misleading in 
that it in fact had the effect of requiring 
more than a preponderance of the evidence to 
establish incendiarism." (Emphasis added) 
238 S.W. 2d at 763. 
The court concluded its opinion by the following sentence: 
"On account of errors indicated in the 
giving of instructions 7 and 9 requested by 
Appellee, the Judgment is reversed and the 
cause remanded for a new trial." Id. at 
764. 
Based on the above law, it.is absolutely clear that proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt is not the standard or burden in a civil 
trial and the trial court committed reversable and prejudicial 
error in so instructing the jury which made it impossible for Skaggs 
to get a fair trial, such that Skaggs is entitled to a new trial 
with proper instructions. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 11 CONSTITUTED REVERSABLE, 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN THAT IT INSTRUCTED THE JURY THAT 
AVONDET, AS A PRIVATE CITIZEN, HAD NO PRIVILEGE TO 
ARREST McFARLAND FOR ASSAULT ON HER PERSON BASED ON 
PROBABLE CAUSE. 
The court's Instruction No. 11 stated as follows: 
"You are instructed that if plaintiff 
committed an assault on Anita Avondet, then 
she had a right to arrest the plaintiff and to 
detain him for purposes of surrendering him to 
the custody of a peace officer." 
(This paragraph was requested by the Defendant Skaggs). 
"However, if an assault had not been committed 
then she had no right to arrest plaintiff. There 
is no statutory privilege protecting against an 
unlawful arrest for assault based on one having 
probable cause to believe an assault had been 
committed." 
The above instruction gave plaintiff's counsel the green 
light to argue to the jury as follows: 
"You and I go out and arrest one of our 
neighbors for what we consider to be improper 
activity. After you make the arrest you better 
make the arrest stick or you've got problems. 
You better be right or you've got a problem. 
And that's why the judge has told you here 
that she doesn't have any privilege, and unless 
Miss Avondet can prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Dr. McFarland assaulted her, then 
she collllilitted false arrest, and Ska s Dru 
tore or out et is res onsi 
Notwithstanding the court's Instruction No. 11, however, the 
Utah law allows a private person to arrest another for a public 
offense committed or attempted in his presence, based on probable 
cause. Section 77-13-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
states as follows: 
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"A private person may arrest another 
for a public offense committed or attempted 
in his presence." 
A fair reading of the above statute, would lead any private citizen 
to believe that he had a right to arrest another for what he reason-
ably believed to be an assault committed in his presence and on 
his person and that probable cause would be valid defense to a 
charge of false arrest. To conclude otherwise, would mean that 
a private citizen would have to read something into the statute 
that is not there, to wit: that if the person arrested is not 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense for which he was 
arrested, then the private citizen is liable for a false arrest. 
That simply is not the law in Utah nor can one conclude that from 
reading the statute. 
While the language of the statute itself does not use the 
words "probable cause to believe", other states with similar statutes 
have read such words into the statute in order for it to make sense. 
For example, California's statute Penal Code 837, is almost identical 
and in the 1980 California case of Gomez v. Garcia, 169 Cal. Rptr. 
350 (1980), the Court of Appeals held as follows: 
"Penal Code Section 837 authorizes a rrivate 
erson to arrest another for a ublic of ense 
committe in his presence. Simi ar to the Utah 
statute 77-13-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended) While the statute does not speak of 
'probable cause to believe' an offense has been 
committed in the present of the person making the 
arrest, (same as Utah) the state of mind of such 
erson of necessit comes into la in a hind si ht 
ana ysis of whether t e arrest was or was not 
ful. 
-17-
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The phrase 'in the presence' is concerned 
with the conduct of the arrestee which forms 
the basis for the arrest. In other words, bad 
conduct must have been in the presence of the 
person making the arrest. Where the validity 
of the arrest turns on whether that conduct 
constitutes a public offense, the test to be 
aKElied must be one of whether the person making 
t e arrest had a reasonable, ood faith belief 
t at it . 1 Cal. Reptr. at 
(Emphasis added) 
The facts of this California case are interesting as they pertain 
to the defense of ones own self or ones own property. The case 
involved a disgruntled exemployee (Gomez) who returned to his old 
place of employment. He was asked to leave, he refused. He was 
arrested by his employer for breach of the peace and the police were 
called. Gomez was acquitted of the misdemeanor charge of breach of 
the peace. Gomez then promptly brought suit for false arrest and 
false imprisonment. The court found that his employer was acting 
on probable cause that he had committed the crime. It must be noted 
that the employer was protecting his own property as it was his 
own place of business, and on that basis, even though Gomez was 
acquitted of the charge for which he was arrested, recovery was 
denied. Probable~ cause was present. It is quite certain the re-
sult would have been the same if the employer had done the arresting 
in protection of his own person but it is likely quite certain the 
result would not have been the same had the employer done the 
arresting in protection of another's property or person. 
In another 1980 case, Chavis vs. Henderson, 488, F.Supp. 
325 (_NY 1980), the Court stated "to support an arrest by a police 
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officer or civilian there must be reasonably trustworthy information 
known to the arresting individual sufficient to warrant a prudent 
man in believing that the petitioner connnitted or was committing 
an offense.'' Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225, 
Thirteen Lawyers Edition 2nd, 142, 1964. 
In a 1971 Utah Law Review Article, the author in a footnote 
likens an Illinois statute concerning the arrest power of a private 
citizen to a Utah statute. The notes states: 
"The arrest power of a private citizen in 
Illinois is similar to that in most other 
jurisdictions. The Illinois statute author-
izes a citizen arrest where there is a reason-
able ground to believe that an offense other 
than an ordinance violation is being committed. 
Illinois Annotated Statutes, C.G. 38 Sections 
107-3. (Emphasis added)(Vol. 4 U.L.R., 486, 487, fn.9) 
In Utah, the statute is even more liberal in that a citizen may 
arrest where inter alia, "any public offense is counnited in his 
presence." Utah Code Annotated 77-13-4. The all important point, 
however, is that said arrest need be based only on probable cause. 
It is submitted that the Court mistakenly based its in-
clusion of the second paragraph of Instruction No. 11 on the 
Restatement of Torts, 2d, Section 119, which was provided to the 
Court and argued by the Plaintiff's counsel, which states as follows: 
"A private person is privileged to arrest 
another without a warrant for a criminal 
offense ... (c) if the other, in the presence 
of the actor, is committing a breach of the 
peace. . " 
Under the comment on clause (c) and (d) the Restatement states as 
follows/ in covering situations where the breach of the peace in-
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valves the property or person of someone other than the person 
making the arrest, which is an all important distinction in under-
standing the law in this area: 
"o. Reasonable suspicion. To create the 
privilege to arrest another, it is not enough 
that the actor-whether a private person or a 
peace officer-reasonably suspects that the other 
is committing a breach of the peace, except as 
stated in Clause (e), and in Section 12l(c), 
where the actor is a peace officer and he arrests 
a participant in an affray. If in fact no breach 
of the peace has been committed, a mistaken 
belief on the part of the actor, whether induced 
by a mistake of law or of fact and however reason-
able, that a breach of the peace has been connnitted 
by the other does not confer a privilege to arrest 
under Clause (c). 
Illustration: 
4. A, a private person, sees B and C 
fighting. Reasonably believing it to be a 
mutual combat, A arrests both B and C. In fact 
B was acting in self-defense. A's arrest of 
B is not privileged under the rule states in 
Section 12l(c)." 
This Restatement section is inapplicable in the case at 
bar because the case at bar involves a breach of the peace on the 
person making the arrest, not a third person as set forth in the 
Restatement Illustration. 
The landmark California case of Collyer vs. S.H. Kress & 
Company, 54 P.2d 20 (1936) makes the distinction between Section 
119 of the Restatement (which involves the person or property of one 
other than the person making the arrest) and the case at bar (which 
involves only the person making the arrest). In 137 ALR 501, the 
annotator approves the distinction recognized in the Collyer case 
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and then quotes directly from the Collyer case as follows: 
"We, therefore, approve the distinctions 
made in Collyer v. Kress· & Company, ... 
That broad statement occasionally appears 
to the effect that probable cause is no 
defense in actions for false imprisonment. 
. . . In all cases involving solely the 
legality of the process, it is obvious that 
probable cause is not pertinent to any ·issue 
in the case. Because of like irrelevancy, the 
statement may properly be made in cases of 
illegal arrests upon suspicion by a private 
person where, by statutory authority or other-
wise, he is permitted to make such an arrest 
only when the offense is being connnitted in 
his presence. However, those authorities which 
hold where a person has reasonable grounds to 
believe that another is stealing his property, 
as distin uished from those where the offense has 
been comp ete , that he is justifie in detaining 
the suspect for a reasonable length of time for 
the purpose of investigation in a reasonable 
manner [citing cases], must necessarily proceed 
upon the theory that probable cause is a defense. 
And this is the law because the right to protect 
one's ro ert from in·ur has intervened. In an 
e fort to harmonize the individual right to liberty 
with a reasonable protection to the person or 
property of the Defendant, it should be said in 
such a charge of false imprisonment, where a 
defendant had robable cause to believe that 
laintiff was about -to in·ure defendant in 
woul constitute but a misdemeanor, that proba le 
cause is a defense, rovided, of course, that the 
etention was reasonable. As already indicated, 
the rule should be different if the offense believed 
to be in the process of commission relates to the 
person or property of another." (Emphasis added) 
The opinion is clear that "if the offense believed to be 
in process of commission relates to the person or property of 
another" probable cause is not enough to confer the privilege to 
arrest. This statement is consistent with the aforementioned 
Restatement Illustration where the arrestor (A) arrested (B) and 
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(:C) for an offense ''believed to be in the process of connnission 
which relate[d] to the person or property of another." On the 
other hand, the opinion is also clear that"probable cause is a 
defense'' if it exists in a circumstance where a defendant had 
probable cause to believe that the plaintiff was about to injure 
the defendant in his person or property." Id. at 502 (emphasis 
added). 
Thus, defense of ones own self, or defense of ones own 
property involves a completely different area of the law than 
the defense of another or d~fense of another's property. This 
distinction of protecting ones own person and property by private 
citizen arrest on the basis of probable cause is noted in the 
recent 1979 District of Columbia case of Fanier vs. Chesapeake and 
Potamac Telephone Co. of Maryland, 404 A.2d 147, 153 (District of 
Columbia, 1979) where the court held as follows: 
"In this jurisdiction probable cause be-
comes material where defendant arrests or de-
tains laintiff without a warrant or where 
e c aims to e actin in a rotection o is 
eerson or property. Lia ility wi not be 
imposed in those circumstances if there are 
reasonable grounds to justify the detention, 
and the detention is accomplished in a reason-
able manner." (Emphasis added) 
The R"estatement of Torts 2nd also Eecognized this all im-
portant distinction in Sections 63-68. In Section 67, the follow-
ing is stated: 
"Section 67. Assault or Im~risonment in 
Self-Defense. The actor is privileged in-
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tentionally to confine another or to put 
him in apprehension of a harmful or of fen-
sive contact for the ur ose of reventin 
him from inflicting a 
contact or other bodil harm u on the actor, 
un er t e same con itions w ich create a 
privilege to inflict a harmful or offense 
contact or other bodily harm upon the other 
for the same purpose.'' (Emphasis added) 
Under the Comment, it is stated as follows: 
"The actor is privileged to impose such a 
confinement or put the other in such an 
apprehension of a bodily contact if, but 
only if, the conditions stated in Section 
65 or 66 are satisfied." 
The conditions of Sections 65 and 66 are that if the actor 
has a reasonable belief a harmful or offensive contact is about 
to be perpetrated upon him, he is extended the privilege under the 
terms of 67. 
The Restatement of Torts, Section 141, entitled Afray or 
a Similar Breach of the Peace, also states: 
"Either a peace officer or a private person 
is privileged to use force against another or 
to impose confinement upon him for the purpose 
of terminating or preventing the renewal of an 
afray or an equally serious breach of the peace 
which is being or has been committed in the 
actors presence. Or, in preventing such other 
from participating therein if (a) the other is 
or the actor reasonably believes him to be 
artici atin or about to artici ate in the 
a ray. and b the confinement or force is not 
intended or likely to cause death or serious 
bodily harm and (c) the actor reasonably 
believes that the force or confinement is nec-
essary to prevent the other from participating 
in the afray or other equally serious breach of 
the peace." Restatement of Torts, Second 
141. 
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Under the Comment, the Restatement states as follows: 
"Affect of actors mistake. In order 
that the privilege may be available under 
the rules stated in this section, it is 
necessary that an afray or other breach of 
the peace be about to be committed or have 
been connnitted immediately before the 
actor's presence. If this is the case, the 
actor is privileged if he believes that the 
other is participating or about to partici-
pate in the afray or breach of the peace and 
his privilege is not destroyed by the fact 
that his believe is mistaken provided the 
mistake is not unreasonable." 
Thus, the guilt or innocence of an arrestee is not the 
pivotal element when one is protecting his own property or 
person. The element to be proved in all cases involving ones own 
person or property is the reasonableness for the arrest by that 
person, or his agent, i.e.; probable cause. 
In further support of the above law is Cervantez vs. J.C. 
Penneys, 595 F.2d 975 (1979) where in the California Supreme 
Court explained Collyer vs. S.H. Kress & Company, supra, as 
follows: 
"At the time of the arrest in this case, 
merchants were protected from civil liability 
to false arrest or false imprisonment by a 
common law privilege that permitted the 
merchant to detain for a reasonable time and 
in a reasonable manner for investigation any 
person whom the merchant had probable cause to 
believe had unlawfully taken or attempted 
to take merchandise from the premises. The 
rivile e to detain u on robable cause was 
esta is e in an e art to armonize the 
individual right to liberty with the inherent 
ri ht of an owner of ro ert to rotect his 
interest in that property. Emp asis a e ) 
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The above underlined language is the balance struck in 
Collyer. The inherent right of an owner to arrest or detain on 
probable cause of theft of his property is justified because he 
might be able to protect his interest. The same is true as 
it pertains to the person of the arrestor who with probable 
cause believes that he must arrest in defense of his own person. 
To again quote Collyer: 
the law because the right to 
or 
Based on this common law privilege, Avondet had the right to 
arrest, in protection of her person, on probable cause of assault. 
The jury should have been so instructed and the court's failure 
to· do so constituted reversable, prejudicial error. 
In Bettolo vs. Safeway Stores, 54 P.2d 24 (1954 ), the 
California court held as follows: 
"The trial court instructed the jury that 
it should disregard any evidence tending to 
prove probable cause and that such defense was 
not applicable in actions for false imprison-
ment where exemplary damages were not asked. 
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The instruction was error and palpably pre-
judicial. Any person may make an arrest for 
a misdemeanor committed in his presence. 
Section 837 Pen. Code." (Emphasis added) 
The Court's Instruction No. 11 in the case at bar was also 
"error and palpably prejudicial." The court instructed the jury 
that "there is no statutory privilege protecting against an un-
lawful arrest for assault based on one having probable cause 
to believe an arrest had been committed." Section 77-13-4, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, specifically says "a private 
person may arrest another for a public offense (assault) committed 
or attempted in his presence" and both the authors of the Utah 
Law Review and the courts of other states with similar statutes 
have all concluded that an ·arrest can be lawfully made based on 
"probable cause" or "where there are reasonable grounds to 
believe" that such an offense (assault) has been connnitted. 
Thus, there is in fact a statutory privilege for a private 
person to arrest for assault and if the assault is cotmnitted or 
attempted on the person making the arrest, such arrest is privileged 
if the arresting person had probable cause or reasonable belief 
that the offense of assault was being connnitted or attempted on 
his person. The jury should have been so instructed and the court's 
failure to so instruct constituted an error at law and was palpably 
prejudicial which made it impossible for Skaggs to get a fair trial 
such that Skaggs is entitled to a new trial with proper instruction~ 
POINT III 
THE COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER THE STANDARD OF 
MALICE IN LAW LAID DOWN IN THE TERRY DECISION 
AND ADOPT MALICE IN FACT INSTEAD OF MALICE 
IN LAW. 
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As a result of the Supreme Court holding in Terry vs. 
Z.C.M.I., 605 P.2d 314 Utah (1979), the court in its Instruction 
No. 14 instructed the jury as follows: 
"Before punitive damages may be awarded 
you must find the issues in favor of the 
plaintiff and against the defendant. In 
cases of false arrest where the defendant 
has not met its burden of establishing that 
the arrest was liased upon probable cause 
· the law im lies such malice as necessary 
to justi y t e awar punitive amages. 
(Emphasis added) 
The Supreme Court decision in Terry, supra, adopting mali·ce 
in law instead of malice in fact, was connnented on by Ronald Boyce 
in an article entitled "A Thumbnail Sketch of the Utah Supreme 
Court Decisions, 1979-1980" published in the December 1981 issue 
of the Utah Bar Journal as follows: 
"The Court indicated that a private party 
could be held liable for false arrest if, 
~fter applying traditional standards of 
probable cause, it was shown that there was 
an abstance of an honest, subjective, probable 
cause." 
Boyce concluded as follows: 
"In authorizing punitive damages on the 
bases of malice in law rather than malice 
in fact, the Court has taken the position 
su orted only a small minorit of 
Juris ictions. Emphasis added 
In 1980, the Utah Law Review Volume 3, in an Article en-
titled ~'Developments in Utah Law", on page 698, that part of the 
Terry decision adopting malice in law instead of malice in fact, 
is criticized as follows: 
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"The questionable step in the court's 
reasoning lay not in equating the absence 
of probable cause with malice in law, but 
in declaring malice in law sufficient to up~ 
hold a punitive damage award. While there is 
some support for the proposition that a find-
ing of malice in law will warrant punitive 
damages, other courts have held that punitive 
damages are only possible when there has been 
a showing of malice in fact. Malice in fact, 
or actual malice, is defined in a variety of 
ways, most involving known falsity or reck-
less disregard for the truth or falsity of 
a charge. However, courts that require actual 
malice to sustain a punitive damage award agreed 
that actual malice involves an element of 
active wrongdoing, not the mere absence of prob-
able cause. 
The actual malice rule creates three tiers of 
liability. If the merchant has probable cause 
to detain a patron, no liability arises. If the 
merchant acts without probable cause, but in 
good faith, liability arises only for compen-
satory damages. Liability for punitive damages, 
however, would arise only when the merchant's 
act is intentionally or reckless malicious. 
The actual malice rule is preferrable for 
several reasons. First, by limiting punitive 
damages to egregious false imprisonments, the 
rule better comports with the notion that 
punitive damages are appropriate only for 
aggravated torts. Second, the actual malice 
rule allows for a fairer allocation of the 
burden of proof. The Utah court was correct in 
holding that the defendant must prove probable 
cause; the plaintiff would otherwise face the 
difficult task of proving a ~egative-the absence 
of probably cause. However, it is both practical 
and logical 1 to place the burden of proving actual 
malice on the plaintiff, and basic fairness de-
mands that a party seeking to punish another 
should bear the burden of proof. Moreover, the 
actual malice rule is consistent with the apparent 
intent of the Utah Legislature to give the mer-
chant greater protection against the shoplifter. 
Finally, the malice-in-law instruction implicitly 
approved by the court may be difficult for jurors 
to understand since they probably conceive of malice 
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in the dictionary sense the malice in fact. 
If the jury is told that lack of probable 
cause establishes legal malice, conversely, 
jurors may infer that probable cause is es-
tablished merely by showing the absence of 
actual malice. That inference would be clearly 
erroneous. Moreover, an instruction that 
punitive damages are allowed on a showing of 
mere legal malce, an instruction apparently 
countenanced by the court, may lead the jury 
to believe that punitive damages are ~equired 
whenever legal malice is established. That 
would also be clearly erroneous. As has been 
suggested, a jury properly following the law 
as enunciated in Terry would be very likely 
to reach a Draconian result when the merchant 
has made a good-faith mistake. On the other 
hand, some juries may be inclined to find 
no cause of action in a good-faith mistake 
situation if they misunderstand the instructions 
and do not believe the merchant's conduct 
warrants the imposition of a punishment. The 
actual malice rule, then, may benefit some 
plaintiffs by making it clear to the jury that 
it may find a middle ground and award compensatory 
damages only. 
The very real problem of shoplifting pits 
two important considerations against each other-
the right of the merchant to protect his inven-
tory and the right of the citizen to be free 
from unwarranted detention and accusation. The 
common law rule of strict tort liability protected 
the patron, but at the expense of the merchant's 
property interest. On the other hand, absolute 
immunity for the merchant would go too far in 
allowing one private citizen the right to detain, 
search and question another. 
The plaintiff in Terry suffered damage, for 
which she deserved compensation. However, by 
sanctioning unrestricted punitive damages for 
a good-faith mistake, the Terry court tipped 
the balance too far in favor of the patron and 
against the merchant. To remedy this imbalance, 
the court or the legislature should adopt the 
actual malice rule. It protects the interests 
of both merchant and patron without opening the 
door to unwarranted punitive damage recoveries." 
Developments in Utah Law, 1980 Law Review at 698. 
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Professor Prosser would agree that malice in fact is much 
better law than malice in law: 
" ... Where any such element of bad intent 
or wanton misconduct is lacking, an imprison-
ment is the result of a mere mistake either 
as to the identity of the party or as to the 
propriaty of the arrest or of the imprisonment, 
punitive damages are denied." W. Prosser, Law 
of Torts, p. 44 (4th Edition, 1971). 
Likewise, malice in law instead of malice in fact is con-
tary to the very purpose of the Utah Shoplifting statutes granting 
a privilege ~o the shopowner which "leaves room for an honest 
mistake'' without the imposition of punitive damages. This con-
clusion is supported by the author of an Annotation entitled 
"Construction and Effect, in False Imprisonment Action, of Statute 
Providing for The Detention of Shoplifters." where at 47 ALR 3d 
1005~1006, the author concludes that: 
" ... the fact that under the statute the 
merchant can act upon reasonable grounds 
(as the Utah statute does) leaves room 
for honest mistake." (Emphasis added and 
language in brackets added) 
In light of the Court's Instructions in the case at bar, 
Plaintiff's counsel argued to the jury that an honest belief 
on the part of Avondet was not sufficient (R. 254) and that 
"If you find that they (Skaggs) failed in 
that burden (proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt that McFarland was guilty of the 
crime of assault was circumstances where a 
private citizen has no privilege to arrest 
for assault based on probable cause) then 
the law implies malice and its' malice that 
gives rise to the award of punitive damages." (R. 233) 
and further that 
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"You people ought to have the courage to 
award a judgment that is significant enough 
that those people (Skaggs) get a message, 
so the next time around it isn't you or 
me as it was Dr. McFarland on this particular 
occasion." (R. 235-236). 
The reference to "you", the jury, is a plea that the jury put 
themselves in the shoes of McFarland, which is an obviously viola-
tion of the "golden rule'' that precludes such argument. 
It is respectfully submitted that if one factual circumstances 
exists which would not warrant punitive damages because of a good 
faith honest mistake in making a false arrest that the Utah law 
as it now stands implying malice in law whenever there is a false 
arrest, notwithstanding the circumstances, that the Terry case, 
adopting malice in law instead of malice in fact, is bad law 
and should be over ruled. The Terry case was a 3-2 decision written 
by Justice Maughn, now deceased, in which Justice Wilkins, who is 
no longer on the bench concurred, in which Justice Stewart con-
curred in result and in which Justice Hall dissented with respect 
to the punitive damages and in which Justice Crockett, who is no 
longer on the bench, concurred in the dissenting opinion of Justice 
Hall. 
CONCLUSION 
Under the Court's Inst~uctions in the case at bar, it was 
impossible for Skaggs to get a fair trial. 
The Court improperly instructed the jury that Skaggs would 
be guilty of falsely arresting Plaintiff for an assault even 
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though Skaggs employee had probable cause to believe that Plaintiff 
had committed an assault on her unless Defendant Skaggs could prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Plaintiff had in fact connnitted the 
crime of assault and that in order for Plaintiff to have been 
guilty of the crime of assault, Defendant Skaggs had to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Plaintiff's acts which gave rise to 
the assault, were done intentionally by which term is meant that 
Plaintiff had a conscious objective or desire to engage in the 
conduct or cause the result, and that Plaintiff would have to 
have been found guilty of the crime of assault in a criminal court. 
Defendant Skaggs objected to the giving of such an instruction 
in that it imposed a criminal burden on Defendant with regard to 
an affirmative defense in a civil trial. 
The Court also improperly instructed the jury that there 
is no statutory privilege protecting against an unlawful arrest 
for assault based on one having probable cause to believe an assault 
had been committed. The Defendant again objected to the court givini 
this instruction since Utah does have a statutory privilege, to-wit: 
Section 77-13-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, as do 
many other states which interpret similar statutes as allowing 
such arrest based on probable cause when the person making the 
arrest is protecting his own person or property. 
The Court instructed the jury that if they determined 
Defendant's employee had falsely arrested Plaintiff that malice 
would be implied, thus allowing for Plaintiff being awarded puni-
tive damages against Defendant Skaggs Companies, Inc. Defendant 
again objecteq to the giving of this instruction on the basis that 
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whether or not there was malice in connection with a false arrest, 
thus allowing for punitive damages should not be implied in all 
cases but determined on the basis of the facts and circumstances 
of each case. 
Because of the Terry case, where Utah adopted malice in 
law instead of malice in fact, what the Utah Law Review predicted 
would occur did occur in the case at bar, to wit, ''a jury properly 
following the law as enunciated in Terry would be very likely to 
reach a Draconian result when the merchant has made a good-faith 
mistake." However, if the jury had been properly instructed with 
respect to Skaggs' burden of proof with regard to its affirmative 
defenses, the jury never would have considered punitive damages. 
Nevertheless, because the jury was improperly instructed with respect 
to Skaggs' burden of proof on its affirmative defens·es, and after 
having heard the arguments of counsel in which counsel for Plaintiff 
violated the golden rule on many occasions in asking the jury 
in effect to put themselves in the shoes of the Plaintiff and to 
award a sufficient amount of punitive damages to make it hurt 
Skaggs so that what Anita Avondet did to Plaintiff would not 
happen to any of the jurors, returned a general verdict in favor 
of Plaintiff and against Defendant Skaggs and awarding $10,000.00 
in general damages and $25,000.00 in punitive damages. 
It is respectively submitted that the Judgment entered in 
favor of McFarland and against Skaggs pursuant to the jury verdict 
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should be ·reversed and the case remanded to the district court 
for a new trial in accordance with proper instructions as to 
Skaggs burden of proof with respect to its affirmative defenses. 
DATED this 12th day of July, 1982. 
/ 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & DAVIS 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of 
the foregoing Defendant/Appellant's Brief, postage prepaid, to 
Mr. Findley P. Gridley, Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent, 427-27th 
Street, Ogden, Utah 84401, on this 12th day of July, 1982. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
